PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG: A STUDY OF WARTIME INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT (VIETNAM WAR, COUNTERINSURGENCY)

Phoenix/Phung Hoang (1967-1970) was an administrative-military operation for South Vietnam, conceived by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and administered in conjunction with the Military Assistance Command of the U.S. Army and the Government of South Vietnam. The author, recently deceased (d. 1982), had a long and distinguished career with the CIA, spent some 20 years in Vietnam, and was deeply involved with the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program. Phoenix/Phung Hoang was a new administrative operation and concept geared to the guerrilla tactics of modern warfare rather than the "big-unit" operations favored in the past. Theoretically, the Program was part of a larger Pacification Effort. In practice, Phoenix/Phung Hoang concentrated on new approaches to counter-insurgency. The author provides an indepth, detailed analysis of logistics, bureaucratic conflicts, U.S.-host government difficulties, legal problems, and the interrelationships of civilian and military components. The conclusions are carried into a philosophical or theoretical matrix. They deal with the changing nature of war, command and operations, policy-making, and decision-making, moral implications, law and due process, labeling, and media. The significance of the study lies primarily in the sources used as documentation. The author was able to obtain declassification of materials previously categorized by the Army and the CIA as "confidential" or "secret." These materials demonstrate, among other things, a significant official terminology. "Pacification" describes counter-insurgency. "Neutralization" refers to killings, assassinations, and abductions relating to "quotas" and "bounties" targeted on both the civilian and military enemy population. For both the general reader and the specialist on wartime intelligence mangement, there is a unique perspective, authentically documented. The implications are far-reaching.