MENTAL CONCEPTS AND ONE'S COMMITMENTS: A DEBATE BETWEEN BEHAVIORIST AND IDENTITY MATERIALISM

My thesis analyzes and compares alternative theories of mind. In the course of providing an exposition and analysis of the leading theories, I reach the preliminary conclusion that materialistic theories are more persuasive than mentalistic ones and, more specifically, that the Private Language Argument provides a persuasive reason for preferring, among the competing materialistic theories, the behavioristic theory rather than the Mind/Brain Identity theory. The thesis then tests this preliminary conclusion by comparing the solution offered by these theories to some problem areas in the philosophy of mind, namely, dreaming, the question whether machines can think, and disembodied existence. In the course of analyzing these concepts, I develop an original behavioristic concept of self-identity. I conclude that the persuasiveness of the Private Language Argument is sustained because only a behavioristic analysis of mental concepts provides an intelligible and intuitively correct understanding of the above notions. Finally, I indicate briefly how an Identity theorist might adopt a behavioristic analysis in order to avoid the problems presented in my thesis.