Interest group influence on regulatory policy

Congress has chosen to delegate a large amount of policy development authority to regulatory agencies, and the agencies have responded by developing a large percentage of the actual law in the United States. Many scholars have examined the influence of interest groups on Congress and legislation, but few have concentrated exclusively on the interest group relationship with the regulatory agencies. The amount of policy being developed by these unelected agents demands further study in the area. This study uses surveys of interest groups and agency officials to explore the interactions that occur between these two actors in the policy development process. The survey data is used to develop a model of interest group influence on regulatory policy employing many of the same variables others have used in their research on interest groups and Congress. Specifically, a regression analysis is used to test the hypothesis that influence is a function of the group's ability to participate in regulatory policy, the geographic distribution of the group's membership, its ability to form coalitions, the organizational type, the policy type, the legitimacy of the group, its access to the agency, and the size of its membership. While the results of the study do not provide strong support for the model, they indicate that under, certain circumstances, many of these variables may impact a group's perception of its influence. There are possible theoretical implications of this research in the further study of major theories in political science. Practically, the question of unbiased policy development by regulatory agencies, in the face of interest group pressures, is raised as a possible concern.