Greek Americans and the Cyprus Crisis, 1974-75: Ethnic Group Politics and Its Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy

In July 1974 a coup d'etat planned and supported by the military junta then ruling Greece led to the temporary downfall of Archbishop Makarios, the president of Cyprus. Turkey, arguing that the Turkish Cypriot community (18 percent of the population) was in danger, invaded the island. After two massive strikes in July and August, the Turkish army gained control of the northern 40 percent of the island. The result was a refugee population of about 210,000--most of whom were Greek Cypriots. Greek Americans responded to the Cyprus crisis almost immediately. Few attempted to justify the actions of the Greek military junta. However, Turkey's invasion of the island--especially its second strike--was condemned as aggressive and morally reprehensible. The fact that, in its invasion of Cyprus, Turkey had used U.S. military arms in violation of U.S. laws quickly became a central issue. During the year that followed, a heated debate developed between Congress and the U.S. Executive. Congress favored imposing an embargo on arms to Turkey until there was progress toward a peaceful Cyprus settlement. An embargo ultimately took effect in February 197.5. The Executive feared an aid ban would alienate Turkey and weaken the strategically critical NATO ally. As a result, it criticized Congress for giving in to ethnic pressures. What apparently startled observers was the swiftness and intensity of Greek American reaction. On the surface, the mobilization of the community was impressive. Already existing ethnic organizations --such as the churches and fraternal associations--provided convenient vehicles through which to articulate political interests and generate a grass-roots movement. In addition, formal groups, once established, displayed a surprising knowledge of lobby techniques and strategies. However, the effectiveness of the Greek American "lobby" probably was overrated. A test of three models of congressional decision making--the instructed-delegate model, the party-politics model, and the belief-system model--reveals that members of Congress based their decisions to vote for or against the Turkish arms embargo on a number of factors. These included personal conviction and party loyalty as well as constituency pressure. Ultimately, the administration, by thrusting Greek Americans into the limelight, helped build up the myth of a potent domestic lobby.