From peace-through-strength to peace-through-denuclearization: A cognitive analysis of Ronald Reagan's Soviet policy

This analysis answers a pertinent question: did changes in President Ronald Reagan's belief system prompt him to adopt a more conciliatory Soviet policy? Defining Reagan's core beliefs as anti-Communism, anti-Sovietism and anti-nuclearism, the paper examines the major events in U.S.-Soviet policy through the prism of Reagan's belief system. The author finds that changes in Reagan's Soviet policy were not a result of changes in his belief system but the result of the interaction of a number of factors, including the rise of soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the culmination of the U.S. military buildup, and personnel turnover in the Reagan Administration. These factors allowed Reagan to disassociate the Soviet Union from Communism and to engage genuinely in arms control and reduction talks. At the end of his Presidency, Reagan's anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism remained intact but began to lose their salience. As these beliefs became less pronounced, Reagan's anti-nuclearism became more salient. His core beliefs remained in place but assumed a new hierarchy.