Explaining variation in violent and nonviolent tactics: repression, linkages, and learning

For organizations contesting the state, what explains variation in tactic selection between violent and nonviolent action? Why do some organizations use primarily violent or nonviolent action across time, while other organizations vary in their use of tactics across time? Why do some groups, contrary to expectations, continue to use nonviolent action after severe government repression, rather than switching to violent action or demobilizing and conducting no public tactics? To answer these questions, I propose a novel theoretical framework combining repression, linkages, and learning. Contrary to conventional explanations connecting increased repression to violent action, I argue that nonviolent action is more likely, even after severe government repression, when organizations have extensive linkages and undergo nonviolent organizational learning – from past conflict history, watching other groups, or training in nonviolent methods. In addition, I categorize organizations as either violent or nonviolent specialists, tactic shifters, or mixed-tactic users. I treat these analytically general frameworks as ideal-types to explain variation in violent and nonviolent action in India from 2010 to 2017. I follow a mixed-methods approach, conducting several months of primarily archival fieldwork, a statistical analysis of an original, hand-coded, quarterly dataset of 45 contentious organizations, and an original social network analysis of 990 distinct ties linking diverse organizations.The dissertation makes a key contribution by generating subnational empirical data that emphasizes smaller-scale organizations using a mixture of violent and nonviolent tactics across time, in contrast to existing cross-national datasets focused on large-scale campaigns using one primary tactic. A second contribution is a furthered understanding of organizational learning. In contrast to the cross-national tactical diffusion literature, I explore how three types of active learning by groups contributed to tactical decision-making when confronted with violent government repression. This learning component is especially relevant for policymakers hoping to disrupt violent forms of learning and promote nonviolent alternatives.