EXPLAINING VARIATION IN UNSANCTIONED VIOLENCE WITHIN REBEL ORGANIZATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Why do rebel organization members engage in violence opposed by the organization's leadership, particularly violence against civilians and fellow rebel members? And why might the use of authorized violence differ across armed structures within a rebel organization? This dissertation argues that discipline varies between armed units within a rebel organization due to the different internal characteristics between these structures. In particular, I highlight the distinction between formal and informal armed structures, through an analytical comparison of formal rebel organizational (FRO) structures, the rebel organization's institutionalized armed structures (e.g., its official armed wing), and rebel armed auxiliaries, the rebel organization's institutionalized and often under-resourced armed structures, which I also refer to as rebel militias. My dissertation makes two primary arguments. My first argument is that rebel armed structures that have political education (PE) and training institutions will be better disciplined than structures that do not. PE/Military training improves rebel member discipline by socializing rebel members to internalize the organization's norms in addition to collectively fostering social cohesion within the organization. As a result, they deter the relative severity and frequency of intra-organizational violence and unauthorized violence directed at civilians. FROs, with a higher degree of organizational capacity and resources, will more likely possess PE/military training than rebel armed auxiliaries. As a result, auxiliaries will engage in more unauthorized violence than FROs. For my second argument, I explain why individual auxiliary units with similar characteristics will differ in their use of unauthorized violence, specifically internal violence. I argue that in lieu of PE/military training socializing mechanisms, these units can be socialized in different ways by the type of governance structures that the rebel organization imposes on these structures. I posit that decentralized rebel governance can socialize trust and cooperation among auxiliaries, by encouraging coordination among rebel actors and maintaining the auxiliary unit's prior autonomy. By contrast, hierarchical governance, which curtails the autonomy of auxiliary units, can socialize distrust and internal discord, which in turn contributes to internal violent conflict. I provide evidence for my arguments through a case study analysis of the African National Congress (ANC) which carried out a thirty-year insurgency against South Africa's apartheid government. To provide evidence for my first argument, I compare two different ANC armed structures: the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC's official armed wing, and what I term pro-ANC armed auxiliaries, the “comrades” and the Self-Defense Units (SDUs). I show that the MK was more disciplined and conducted less unsanctioned violence due to the PE/military training provided to its members. Auxiliary members generally lacked PE/military training and were therefore more prone to indiscipline and unsanctioned violence. Second, I provide support to my second argument through a comparative case study of different SDU units operating in different townships in South Africa's Transvaal Province, I show that where the ANC imposed hierarchical governance structures over its SDUs, this fostered a breakdown in order and internal ANC violence. Where the ANC established a decentralized, power-sharing form of governance over its SDUs, there was comparatively less violent internal conflict.