Differing incentives of appointed and elected prosecutors and the relationship between prosecutor policy and votes in local elections

Prosecutors in the United States may be either appointed or elected officials. They are also bureau chiefs of a public office. Most models of prosecutor behavior focus on the bureaucratic role of the prosecutor. The objective of this research is to present a model of prosecutor behavior that places the political objectives of prosecutors in the fore. This research reviews the historical development of the prosecutor's office in the United States and examines the previous theoretical and empirical research on prosecutor incentives. Multivariate statistical tests are employed to test hypotheses derived from a political model of prosecution using data from a nationwide sample of elected and appointed prosecutors. Several theorized relationships are tested empirically. First, it is hypothesized that elected prosecutors have a greater incentive (relative to appointed prosecutors) to report adopting office policies viewed as responsive to communities. Second, for those prosecutors that are elected, it is hypothesized that an appearance of greater responsiveness leads to greater political support of incumbent prosecutors, measured by votes in reelection efforts. Elected prosecutors were not consistently found to be more likely to report involvement in policies viewed as responsive to the public in the presented models. In a test limited to elected prosecutors, the appearance of greater responsiveness was linked to greater political support of incumbent prosecutors. This research reveals significant differences between appointed and elected prosecutors in their desire to appear responsive to communities and suggests that elections may serve as a viable mechanism to ensure responsiveness from the prosecutor's office.