Deterrence and nuclear terrorism

Nuclear terrorism is a frightening prospect and, according to many, represents one of the gravest threats to the United States at present. In order to prevent the terrorist use of nuclear weapons against the American homeland, scholars and policymakers alike are exploring strategies and policies of deterrence. This thesis seeks to clarify and contribute to the current debate surrounding deterrence and nuclear terrorism by examining whether deterrence is in fact applicable to nuclear terrorism and whether or not strategies of deterrence are effective or even practical options for U.S. policy. Focusing on the al-Qaeda organization, in particular, this thesis compares how well certain characteristics of the group, namely its rationality, nonstate nature, and strength of motivation, fit within the theoretical framework of deterrence developed by scholars of international relations. Ultimately, deterrence applies somewhat unevenly to al-Qaeda and nuclear terrorism, suggesting that effective deterrence may be at best tenuous and short-lived.