Conflict and reform: The evolution of special operations in U.S. national security strategy

This paper explores the evolution of U.S. Special Operations Forces and special operations doctrine since World War II, the role of special operations in U.S. National Security Policy, and the resurgence of special operations forces since the late 1970s. The recent renewal of special forces as a viable foreign policy tool is set in historical perspective reflecting the decline of special forces after World War II, their resurgence during the Kennedy Administration, subsequent decline after Vietnam and a renewed interest in special forces for low-intensity conflict since 1979. Brief case studies of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), the Mayaguez incident and the Iran rescue attempt demonstrate the great risk and difficulty of conducting special operations. Since 1979, a concern about the threats terrorism and low-intensity conflict represent to U.S. national interests has renewed public and Congressional support for special operations forces, but the numerous political and military problems associated with employing special operations forces abroad has made many political and military leaders reluctant to fully endorse their increased use.