Analysis of the Cross-Border Capital Flows by Foreign Bank Branches and Macroprudential Policy: The Case of Korea

<p>The Korean economy has suffered two financial crises in 1997 and 2008, mainly due to volatile capital flows by foreign bank branches in Korea. Therefore, it is very important to understand the economic drivers and mechanisms of their capital flow management decisions. So far, it is known that foreign bank branches tend to actively adjust their borrowings from headquarters in response to changes in monetary policy in their home countries. However, in the first chapter, I find statistically significant evidence that Covered Interest Parity deviation and home macroprudential policies are more important factors than home monetary policy. I also demonstrate that no single country (or single currency) can play a dominant role in interoffice borrowings between headquarters and their branches in Korea. In the second chapter, I find evidence that the leverage cap regulation introduced by the Korean government in 2010 as one of the foreign exchange related macroprudential policy measures contributed to enhancing financial stability without hampering the positive roles of foreign bank branches in Korea. Specifically, foreign bank branches responded to changes in leverage cap regulation by adjusting their capital, and their business activities were not affected by the regulatory changes. In the third chapter, I review the challenges that Korea has faced due to the volatile cross-border capital flows and the Korean government's efforts to achieve successful economic growth and financial stability, especially focusing on the development of a prudential regulatory system during three phases: 1) before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 2) between the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and 3) after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis to the present.</p>