American regulation of arms exports

The regulation of the traffic in arms is a subject which has been considered from many points of view. In recent times the problem has been viewed from the standpoints of the preservation of neutrality and of the deterrents of aggression, or sanctions, as well as from those of international ethics and of diplomacy. It has played its part in American politics, in schemes for world organization, and in plans for the conservation of resources. In earlier periods, arms embargoes were an important instrument in the Latin American policy of the United States. In the dawn of United States history, ill-fated experiments with complete embargoes were an important incident in the history of our relationship to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. All of these and other aspects of the regulation of the traffic in arms throughout the history of the United States have been analyzed by Professor Atwater in this book. His previous detailed study of the application of sanctions by the members of the League of Nations against Italy during the Ethiopian War has provided him with an unusual background for considering the more recent aspects of the American policy. At this time, it may be that the various uses of the arms embargo as an instrument of policy fade into the background while more pressing problems of defense and perhaps of war itself occupy the center of the stage. Yet the history of the use of embargoes, both statutory and "moral," is still being written as part and parcel of the history of the neutrality of the United States. The repeal of the arms embargo when the Neutrality Act of 1939 was passed is clearly seen in retrospect as the first step in aid to Britain short of war. At this writing, one can not yet say whether the United States Government's refusal to yield to the clamor for an anti-Japanese embargo will prove to have been part of the prelude to peace or to war. But it is clear that the decision to raise or to impose an arms embargo is fraught with consequences of the utmost seriousness. It is also true that present prophesies of post-war world conditions are hazardous. Nevertheless, under all of the hypotheses which one may select as a basis for analyzing the future, it is safe to assume that the regulation of the traffic in arms will play its part, whether as a measure of conservation, of defense, of national pressure or of international cooperation. As Professor Atwater points out in his Introduction, however, it is always necessary to consider the purpose for which an arms embargo has been imposed before utilizing the experience with it as a precedent for comparable action. This book with its record and appraisal of past experience has, therefore, a permanent value not only as a history but also as an aid in planning the future.