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2005-01 Tariff liberalization and increased administrative protection : is there a Quid Pro Quo?

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posted on 2023-08-05, 07:45 authored by Robert FeinbergRobert Feinberg, Kara ReynoldsKara Reynolds

Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non-traditional protection against imports obtained through administrative procedures such as antidumping enforcement will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs and quotas are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalization in the spread of antidumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyze the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of antidumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of antidumping policies. We find that tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using antidumping protection but also the total number of antidumping petitions filed by countries.

History

Publisher

Department of Economics, American University

Language

English

Notes

Working Paper No. 2005-01. 20 pages.

Handle

http://hdl.handle.net/1961/4923

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