2017-08 How do countries respond to antidumping filings?
Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the antidumping petitions filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory antidumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding. Using a panel of global antidumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyze under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an antidumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory antidumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.