American University
Browse
auislandora_70522_OBJ.pdf (503.1 kB)

2013-05 Under the cover of antidumping

Download (503.1 kB)
online resource
posted on 2023-08-04, 06:10 authored by Kara ReynoldsKara Reynolds

Anecdotal evidence suggests that domestic firms can use the antidumping petition process to engage in collusion and increase domestic prices. In this paper, I test whether the antidumping petition process itself can help domestic firms raise prices. I propose a method to identify whether firms in the industry experience a structural break in the level of market power held by the firms at the time that they file their antidumping petition. I then use this methodology to analyze the impact of antidumping petitions on competition levels in two industries. I find little evidence that either of these industries increased their market power following the filing of petitions for trade relief, nor even from the protection that resulted from these petitions, suggesting that the widespread belief that antidumping leads to more market power may not always hold.

History

Publisher

American University (Washington, D.C.)

Notes

Working Paper Series January 2013 No. 2013-5

Handle

http://hdl.handle.net/1961/auislandora:70522

Usage metrics

    Economics

    Categories

    No categories selected

    Keywords

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC