R2P's "ulterior motive exemption" and the failure to protect in Libya

Mass atrocity prevention has been controversial, both when members of the international community have taken ac-tion as well as when they have failed to do so. In 1999, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged the interna-tional community to reconcile the need to respect state sovereignty with the need to protect populations from egre-gious human rights violations. R2P’s emergence offered an opportunity to move past the discourse and practice associated with its predecessor—“humanitarian intervention.” However, while R2P has succeeded in changing the dis-course, it has failed to make a change in practice. A source of this failure is R2P’s “ulterior motive exemption.” Using the R2P intervention in Libya as a case study, this article concludes that because ulterior motives existed: (1) NATO’s prima-ry intent of civilian protection quickly evolved into the intent to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi; (2) in exceeding its mandate, NATO committed an act of aggression; (3) NATO continued to militarily support the rebels while they were committing war crimes and severe human rights violations; (4) NATO’s actions resulted in civilian casualties, which NATO has refused to investigate; and (5) NATO abdicated its responsibility to protect Libyans from the human suffering that continued subsequent to Qaddafi’s execution.